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SOME ANTITRUST PROBLEMS IN
GOVERNMENT INSURED/GUARANTEED
MORTGAGE LENDING
RICHARD ARLEN SALITERMAN*

N

ew York City is pocked with vast clusters of burned out or tinned

up, vacant single-family dwelling units. These sections of the
city, especially portions of the eastern Brooklyn and southern Queens
neighborhoods, take on special interest because only a few years earlier
they were populated by highly productive citizens, and because many
of these dwellings are of solid, well-designed construction. Today, wild
dogs and criminal elements are the inhabitants. This situation is the
result of a variety of forces.
This paper will examine one of those forces, the government
insured/guaranteed mortgage lending system, as it relates to the antitrust law. First, the overall market setting of New York City will be
described. Next, some of the possible antitrust law issues involved in
its operation will be discussed. It must be cautioned, however, that
only a suggestive and far from exhaustive discussion of the particular
facts of the New York City situation as related to these issues has been
ventured. Finally, a brief evaluation of the effectiveness of antitrust
law as a remedy for problems such as those existing in New York City
will be offered as well as some additional considerations for improving
the mortgage lending system generally.
Although the New York City situation has been selected for study
in this paper, it is important to note that New York is probably representative of conditions that exist in several major cities. There is welldocumented evidence that similar or identical problems are found in
Chicago, Detroit, St. Louis, Philadelphia, and Denver.' Indeed, as a
* Member, District of Columbia and Minnesota Bars. B.A., University of Minnesota,

1968; J.D., Columbia University, 1971.
1. Silverman, Homeownership for the Poor and Racial Segregation, 48 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 72, 81 (1973); Stegman, Low-Income Ownership: Exploitation and Opportunity,
50 J. URBAN L. 371, 373 (1973); Note, Abuses in the Low Income Homeownership
Programs-TheNeed for a Consumer Protection Response by the FHA, 45 TEMP. L.Q.
461, 471 (1972). See also UNITED STATES COM~tMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, HOMEOWNERSHIP FOR LOWER INCOME FAMILIES: A REPORT ON THE RACIAL AND ETHNIC
IMPACT OF SECTION 235 PROGRAM (1971) (Civil Rights Commission study of housing

in Denver, Philadelphia, St. Louis and Little Rock).
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result of imperfections in the government insured/guaranteed lending
scheme, over 240,000 usable dwellings throughout the nation were
abandoned between 1968 and 1971 resulting in a 2.4 billion dollar loss
to the federal government. 2

I. THE NEW YORK SETrING
In the years since the Second World War, the pressures of living
in Harlem and other parts of Manhattan reached new thresholds of
intolerability. Tens of thousands of blacks and other minority groups
began to look at eastern Brooklyn and southern Queens to find suitable housing. Often, and understandably, many of these people-not
completely sophisticated in real estate matters and often seeking only
to rent an apartment or small home-fell prey to a large and unrepresentative subculture of unscrupulous real estate dealers. Not coincidentally, the offices of these dealers were located on streets abutting
principal subway exits of lines running from the congested areas of
Manhattan.3
The dealers directed these new "immigrants" from Manhattan to
single family homes that were available for immediate sale. Sellers of
these homes were whites who either sensed, or at a later date were
stampeded by blockbusting into understanding, the changes taking
place in the racial and ethnic makeup of the community. The whites
were often willing to sell at a low price due to their fear of taking an
even larger loss at a later date. Because the incoming people were
anxious to find a home, they were willing to pay high prices. This gap
facilitated the exaction of an unreasonable spread of points and fostered
other mortgage financing abuses which ultimately led to rapid, massive
foreclosures.
Mutual savings banks, savings and loan institutions, commercial
banks, life insurance companies, and mortgage companies supply the
bulk of mortgage funds for private investment. Several other institutions also provide, in lesser degrees, mortgage financing.4 The problem
that plagued the troubled neighborhoods in Brooklyn and Queens,
2. Stegman, supra note 1, at 373. See HUD

STATISTICAL YEARBOOK

3. See Silverman, supra note 1, at 81-82.
4. A. AXELROD, C. BERGER & Q. JOHNSTONE,
CASES AND MATERIALS 92-137 (1971).
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however, was that almost without exception only a certain few mortgage
companies were making loans for single family residential units. Indeed, the choice was limited to whichever company the real estate
dealer said would supply the funds. The terms of these mortgages
were dictated solely by the mortgage companies.
The combined state of few suppliers and an apparent lack of competition was unusual because in other parts of the city, and in other
states, a large number of varied institutions engaged in a vigorous,
healthy competition for loans on similar properties. It is also puzzling
in that since most of the loan applications were accompanied by Federal
Housing Administration (FHA), or Veterans' Administration (VA)
guarantees in case of mortgagor default, the degree of lender risk in
making a loan was not substantial.
Congress initiated the FHA-insured mortgage in 1934; 5 and in
1944, the VA-guaranteed mortgage as part of the Serviceman's Readjustment Act.6 In 1968, by enacting Section 235, Congress expanded
the FHA Act of 1934 to enable it to reach lower income families who
previously were not able to take advantage of the earlier acts.7 It was
believed that homeownership by low income people would add to the
stability of the community. Under these plans, the buyer would obtain
his loan from an "approved" mortgagee who would agree to make the
loan on the condition that the FHA would commit itself to provide
reimbursement to the mortgagee should the buyer default.
Among the documents required to be submitted to the FHA
prior to receiving a commitment were: (1) an appraisal of the property,
which usually was conducted by a local officer of the FHA, and (2)
evidence of the credit standing of the buyer.
The few mortgage companies that did make loans, did so only
on this government-guaranteed basis. In collaboration with less-thanhonest realty companies, these mortgage companies employed several
fraudulent devices in order to induce the commitments or guarantees.
Included in the schemes were doctoring up faulty credit reports on
applicants for loans and bribing FHA officials in order to obtain in5. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et seq. (1970) (orginally enacted as National Housing Act
of 1934, ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246).
6. Ch. 5, 58 Stat. 291 (1944) (repealed 1958) (now 38 U.S.C. §§ 1801 et seq.

(1970)).
7. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701, 1715z (1970).
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flated appraisals on the property, as well as to generally expedite the
government-guarantee applications."
Once a commitment was made, the sellers were required by the
mortgage company and broker to pay a large number of points. These
points, when kept within reason, are perfectly legal under the FHA
system and not considered usurious in most jurisdictions. However,
in the neighborhoods inundated by new minority residents they
ranged as high as 20 points on many transactions and usually, over a
period of time, averaged an unconscionable eight to ten points above
the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) price. The points
were really paid by the purchaser and were reflected in the higher than
usual price he paid for his home.
The use of points or discounts originated because one key feature
of FHA- and VA-guaranteed mortgages is a statutory ceiling on the
interest chargeable by a lender. When the market rate of interest
rose, it would be impossible to attract any lender to make a guaranteed
loan unless he could be given this extra interest in the form of points.
Generally, when points are paid, the borrower receives one sum and
is required to pay back a loan principal in a greater amount. The
difference is the discount, and the percentage of that difference compared to the contract debt is the number of points involved.
Not only were unreasonable point spreads or discounts shouldered
by buyers anxious for homes, but often the buyer was informed by the
realtor or mortgage company that the deal would not go through unless
additional payments were made "under the board" to the mortgage
company's representative. The amount of these payments varied substantially from customer to customer and was not related to the amount
of financing obtained or other costs. The illegal payments ran as high
as more than 300 dollars per transaction. Often, the buyers were not
aware of the fact that they were victims of hold-ups-they were simply
paying additional "closing costs."
Once a transaction was completed and an FHA- or VA-committed
mortgage was obtained, the mortgage company would transfer the
mortgage instrument like any other negotiable instrument or bond,
8. The United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York has undertaken
prosecution against realtors, mortgage companies, and FHA officials for these activities.
At the present time there have been more than 25 indictments against more than 100
individuals amounting to over 1000 counts. N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1972, at 1, col. 8;
id. at 48, col. 1.
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to financial institutions, such as banks, which would usually warehouse

them for reassignment or further transfer. It is conceivable that one
mortgage would change hands several times. The widespread use
of points enabled easier transfer in that a transferee could pay much
less than face value. A very large number of these mortgages were
ultimately purchased on the secondary market by the FNMA.'
The New York City problem did not lie with the transfer process
itself. When operating efficiently, this process encourages large amounts
of capital to be distributed where it is most needed and where it will
be most productive. The real probem was that the properties upon
which these thousands of mortgages rested went into immediate arrears
and foreclosure.' 0 The mortgage guarantees were then turned in to
the FHA and the current holders made handsome profits at the expense of the government.
After the guarantees were redeemed by the FHA, the United
States Government became the owner of many acres of urban desert.
Those houses that were still usable were resold by the FHA at a loss.:"
Frequently, the same realtors who initially had arranged for the sale of
the properties were themselves the purchasers at the government sales.
In these instances, the entire cycle was repeated.
One interesting aspect of the cycle was the activity of brokers who
purchased houses for resale to incoming buyers. To do so, most brokers
9. 12 U.S.C. § 1719 (1970). FNMA is a part government and part private institution which stimulates mortgage lending by purchasing mortgages on the secondary
market. After purchase, it earns profits for its private shareholders by (1) reselling the
mortgages, (2) retaining them and receiving interest. The secondary mortgage market
is, in some localities, comprised of many of the same institutions who lend on the
primary market. Traditionally, participants purchase with the objective of obtaining a
high yield on relatively short term paper. In New York City, the certainty of immediate
foreclosure, even though the mortgages were long term, may have had a similar attraction to secondary market investors.
10. The foreclosure and arrears rate ranged up to an extraordinary 18 percent.
See Hearings on Competition in Real Estate and Mortgage Lending Before the Subcomm.
on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972)

(containing substantial testimonial, documentary and statistical evidence regarding the
unusual foreclosure rate on government-insured/guaranteed mortgages as well as other
mortgage-lending problems in the neighborhoods of New York).
11. The average U.S. government loss on a foreclosed property in recent years is,
nationally, well over $3,000. See Hearings Before the House Comm. on Banking and
Currency, Interim Report on HUD Investigation of Low- and Moderate-Income Housing

Programs, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1971). From 1968 through 1970, the federal
government has become the owner of 96,339 properties through foreclosure of FHAguaranteed mortgages. HUD STATISTICAL YEARinoox, Table 372 (1970).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

had to pay mortgage companies a uniform and ardifically high rate of
2 percent per month for such interim or speculative financing. The
incoming buyer absorbed these, like many other unnecessary extra
costs, by a wider point spread.
II. SOME ANTITRUST ISSUES
Section One of the Sherman Act outlaws "[e]very contract, combination in the form of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several states."12 A "contract" is
usually defined as an actual agreement. A "conspiracy" is the result
of an agreement, rather than agreement per se.' 3 A "combination" is
broadly defined as a union of two or more previously independent
persons. An agreement or formal contract is not required for a combination to exist.1 4 Today, however, courts draw little distinction
between proof requirements for conspiracies and combinations. The
"trade or commerce" language provides for jurisdiction not only over
dealings in goods, but also over dealings in intangibles such as mortgages and loans as well as commercial services such as those provided
by real estate brokers. 5 Generally, the restraint of competition sufficient to amount to a "restraint of trade" is determined by looking for
either an intent to restrain trade or for an effect of abnormally re6
strained trade.'
The specific language of the Act requires that behavior be interstate in character. Nevertheless, this requirement can be met when
a constraint local in nature substantially affects commerce between
7
the states.'
Courts apply either a rule of reason test or a per se test to a
given fact situation in determining lawfulness. When the "rule of
reason" is applied, courts will ask whether there is any adverse effect
12. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
13. United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 607-08 (1910).
14. United States v. Parke Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 39-44 (1960).
15. United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 485j 490 (1950);
United States v. South Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 560-61 (1943);
Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 435-37 (1931).
16. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 56-68 (1910).
17. E.g., Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320 (1967); Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v.
American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1947).
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on competition caused by a given arrangement between competitors.'
If one is found, the court must determine whether there are any reasonable justifications for this injury to competition.
Under the per se test certain restraints are subject to a conclusive presumption of unreasonableness. 9 The courts reason that
the chances of finding justification for these restraints are small in
comparison to the likelihood of very serious damage to competition.
Price-fixing and allocation of geographical territories or of customers,
usually fall into this category. To a lesser extent, boycotting third
parties and tying arrangements are held illegal per se.20
A. Price-Fixing

Any combination or agreement between competitors made with
the purpose and effect of tampering in any way with price structures
is unlawful per se, regardless of justification. 21 It is no defense that
competitors may possess a combined power that is actually unable to
control prices in a given market.2 2 Recent decisions suggest that it is
not necessary for any price list to exist or for any detailed verbal communications to be exchanged.23 Price levels need not be unreasonable
24
for there to be a finding of price-fixing.
18. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 66 (1911); E.

SINGER, ANTI-

TRUST ECONOMICS, 28-32, 35 (1968).

See also United States v. American Tobacco Co.,
221 U.S. 106 (1910); W. LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA, 256-73
(1965) (interesting historical analysis of the evolution of the rule of reason and the
per se tests as well as the Sherman Act generally); E. RoSTOW, PLANNING FOR FREEDOM,

278-81 (1959).
19. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 327-29 (1896).
See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 82 (1911) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945).
20. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 437-38 (2d Cir.
1945); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 291-94 (6th Cir, 1898),
aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). But see United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 689
(S.D.N.Y. 1953); United States v. National Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319, 322
(E.D. Pa. 1953).
21. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), where
the Supreme Court held that, "[a]ny combination or agreement between competitors,
formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging or
stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se."
Id. at 223.
22. 310 U.S. at 221.
23. See United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969), suggesting that a mere "expectation" of another actor's response pattern may be enough.
24. See City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D.
Pa. 1962) (proof of unreasonable prices is not always necessary in determining illegality); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1926). "The reasonable
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In the eastern Brooklyn and southern Queens neighborhoods of
New York City, mortgage companies generally were charging a uniform rate far above that charged in other similar neighborhoods of
the city and state.25 Even though there was some bidding between
companies which provided occasional exceptions to the uniform rates,
most of it was within a narrow ambit so as not to upset a widely accepted system. Furthermore, all mortgage companies charged, without
exception, an identical usurious 2 percent per month for speculative
or interim loans to brokers.
It was found that one of the ways in which information was informally exchanged was in conversations between and among mortgage
companies and realtors at various social "affairs." This information
included in part the rates charged and the particular neighborhoods
in which prospective activity might be focused.
B. Territory and Customer Allocation
Any arrangement among competitors to divide or apportion territories for distribution of their service or product is illegal. In A ddyston
Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States,6 the Supreme Court declared unlawful a horizontal contractual arrangement between six pipe manufacturers to geographically assign markets in 36 states.
In United States v. Arnold Schwinn

&

Co.,27 the Court struck

down a bicycle manufacturer's vertical restraint upon its distributors.
The distributors were instructed to sell only to franchised dealers. The
Court believed that such limitations were unreasonable restraints upon
alienation. More important is the notion that the Court's decision
was implicitly grounded upon the theory that Schwinn's arbitrary exclusion of one large group of buyers greatly detracted from the overall
virulence of the marketplace and therefore was anticompetitive. 28
price fixed today may through economic and business changes become the unreasonable
price of tomorrow. Once established, it may be maintained unchanged because of the
absence of competition secured by the agreement for a price reasonable when fixed."
Id. at 397.
25. These high rates do not account for the huge variation in actual rates caused

by "under the table" payments. Even with these payments, rates were still uniformly
far above rates in other markets.
26. 175 U.S. 211 (1899), aff'g 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898). See also United States
v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).

27. 388 U.S. 365 (1969).
28. Id. Usually a manufacturer may lawfully select to whom he will sell his goods.
However, in a market characterized by a substantial absence of competition, as were
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In New York City there were no territorial allocations between
various mortgage companies. However, there was evidence of allocation between mortgage companies and other financial institutions
engaged in mortgage lending. With the exception of perhaps only
one savings and loan institution, non-mortgage company lending institutions had avoided making loans in the neighborhoods in question,
even while often purchasing on the secondary market. During the
early transitional stages from all white neighborhoods, both brokers
and mortgage companies would arrange for sales and financing with
a clear preference toward non-white incoming purchasers.
C. Boycotting Third Parties
While an individual entity has the right to do business with
whomever it desires, when two or more entities arrive at an understanding not to do business with a third party, antitrust problems generally ensue. Third-party boycotting also includes situations where two
or more entities agree to do business only on certain terms.
In Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealersv. United States,2 the Supreme Court outlawed a non-contractual arrangement under which an
association circulated among its members lists of wholesale lumber dealers who sold directly to consumers rather than by the discount route
through retailers. The Court said that the action was "intended to
have the natural effect of causing retailers to withhold their patronage
30
from the company listed."
In New York, the mortgage companies operating in the areas in
portions of the New York City lending market, problems follow. The Court in Schwinn
stated:
[I]f nothing more is involved than vertical "confinement" of the manufacturer's
own sales of the merchandise to selected dealers, and if competitive products
are readily available to others, the restrictions, on these facts alone would not
violate the Sherman Act.
Id. at 376 (emphasis added).
29. 234 U.S. 600 (1914). See also United States v. General Motors Corp., 354 U.S.
127 (1966); Radient Burners, Inc. v. People's Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656
(1961); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959). In General
Motors, the Court held illegal an arrangement whereby GM and three automobile associations in Los Angeles participated in a scheme to prevent sales by any franchised
Chevrolet automobile dealer to "discount houses." While Supreme Court decisions support the view that a per se approach would be applied, a few lower federal court decisions suggest that there may be exceptions. See, e.g., United States v. Insurance Board of
Cleveland, 144 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Ohio 1956).
30. Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 609
(1914).
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question jointly refused to deal with any broker or purchaser who
would not come forward with the necessary points or under-the-board
payments, portions of which were used by the mortgage companies
to bribe FHA personnel. Highly ethical attorneys practicing in the
neighborhoods similarly found themselves excluded if they refused
to play the game. In addition there were strong indications that, during
the initial blockbusting phases, white buyers had great difficulty obtaining homes and financing in the problem neighborhoods.
D. Tying Arrangements
Perhaps more than in other areas, both per se and rule of reason
tests have been applied to tying arrangements. In order for a marketing situation to be declared an illegal tying arrangement, it is usually
necessary for the seller to possess very substantial power in the "tying"
or "tie-in" product. The seller then must refuse to deal with the buyer
unless the buyer also purchases a second, different product, the "tied"
product.
In United States v. Loew's Inc.,3 1 blockbooking of motion pictures
for sale or license for television exhibition was held to be a per se
violation of Section One of the Sherman Act. Pressure had been
applied to television stations to accept inferior films (the "tied" product) along with very desirable films (the "tie-in" product). The Court
'said that "tying arrangements, once found to exist in a context of
sufficient economic power, are 'illegal' without elaborate inquiry as to
'32
the business excuse for their use."

The Court also said that market dominance or "some power to
control price as to exclude competition" was not the sole test of market
power. It added that crucial economic power could be inferred from
the tying or tie-in product's desirability to consumers or from the
"uniqueness of its attributes.

' 33

Also relevant is FortnerEnterprises,Inc. v. U.S. Steel.84 U.S. Steel
31.. 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
32. Id. at 51-52. For exceptions to the per se rule, see Susser v. Carvel Corp.,
206 F. Supp. 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd, 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), petition for
cert. dismissed, 381 U.S. 125 (1965); United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187
F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
33. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962). See generally Northern
Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); Turner, The Validity of Tying
Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, 72 HARv. L. REv. 50 (1958).
34. 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
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conditioned a loan by one of its wholly-owned financial subsidiaries
to a Kentucky land developer upon the developer's agreement to purchase 219 prefabricated homes manufactured by U.S. Steel. The
"uniqueness" of the tying product, from which the Court, in part,
reasoned that market control existed, was that U.S. Steel was in a
position to offer loans on highly attractive terms to borrowers, namely
loans at 100 percent of the value of the land acquired. Loans on similar
terms could not have been obtained from any other source. The Court
also found market power from the higher price that U.S. Steel was able
to exact for the tied product (prefabricated homes).
There were strong suggestions of the existence of tying arrangements in New York City. For instance, the average incoming buyer
could not obtain the home of his choice unless he also consented to the
broker's selection of inter alia closing attorneys, title company, and fire
insurance company. In addition, the buyer had to agree (or otherwise
was forced by circumstances) to take out an FHA- or VA-insured mortgage with a specific mortgage company before a deal would be completed. Indeed, he had also to agree to pay a large number of points or to
come forward with money under the table. Interestingly, the specific
house which the broker possesses the right to sell, and which is desired
by a particular buyer, may be considered a tie-in product.
Even more clearly, there were indications that realtors themselves
may have been victims of the tying arrangements of loans very similar
to the arrangement in Fortner. It was impossible for many brokers
to obtain vitally needed interim or speculative financing (for which
they agreed to pay 2 percent per month) for their own purchases
unless they also found customers to take out FHA- or VA-insured mortgages with the same mortgagee.
E. Section One EvidentiaryIssues
A crucial issue under Section One of the Sherman Act involves
the delineation of those circumstances sufficient to support an inference that an unlawful contract or conspiracy existed among competitors. In one sense this often reduces to asking whether the facts lead
-to the belief that the business behavior in question, such as price-fixing
or horizontal allocation of geographical markets, was not primarily a
product of conscious and independent judgment.
One important group of cases supports the inference that an
129
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agreement or conspiracy exists largely because the "response pattern"
of a group of business entities to a given business decision was so
similar or unanimous. This pattern is termed "conscious parallelism. '" 5
The general rule, however, is that conscious parallelism alone will not
suffice to permit an inference of conspiracy, and that additional evidence
suggesting conspiracy is needed. 36
United States v. Container Corporation of America37 is the most
recent major "proof of conspiracy" case and represents a departure, at
least in attitude, from the general rule. The case involved an arrangement among 14 defendants who produced 90 percent of the corrugated containers from plants located in the southeastern United
States. Capacity for production exceeded demand which was inelastic.
Entry into the industry was easy from a financial standpoint, since
only 50 to 75 thousand dollars capital was required. The arrangement
was simply that each participant, upon request of a competitor, would
furnish information as to the most recent price charged or quoted to
individual customers; reciprocity was expected. The Court held this
to be a price-fixing arrangement per se illegal under Section One of
the Sherman Act.
Based on its observation that if a company behaved in a certain
way it could "expect" others to follow, the Court found an illegal behavior pattern. It so stated:
Here all that was present was a request by each defendant from its
competitor for information as to the most recent price charged or
quoted, whenever it needed such information and whenever it was
not available from another source. Each defendant on receiving that
35. See United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942); Interstate Circuit,
Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
36. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226 (1939). In
Theatre Enterprises Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954),
the Court states:
But this Court has never held that proof of parallel business behavior conclusively establishes agreement or, phrased differently, that such behavior itself
constitutes a Sherman Act offense. Circumstantial evidence of consciously
parallel behavior may have made heavy inroads into the traditional judicial
attitude toward conspiracy; but "conscious parallelism" has not yet read conspiracy out of the Sherman Act entirely.
Most courts have steadfastly followed this rule that a common and conscious pattern
of business behavior, among competitors, without more, will not permit an inference of
conspiracy. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966), ret'g 234
F. Supp. 85 (S.D. Cal. 1964); ABA SEcTION OF ANTITRUST LAw, ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS 1968-1971, at 8 (Supp. 1971) ; id. 1955-1968, at 22-24 (1968).
37. 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
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request usually furnished the data with the expectation that he would
be furnished reciprocal information when it wanted it....
There was to be sure an infrequency and irregularity of price exchanges between the defendants; and often the data was available
from the records of the defendants or from customers themselves.
Yet the essence of the agreement was to furnish information whenever
requested.38

It is important to note, however, that the Court suggested that
there is some room for legal conscious parallelism. In a footnote, the
Court stated, "[t]his [behavior] is obviously quite different from the
parallel business behavior condoned in Theatre Enterprises,Inc..... ,,30
Yet, if the expectation theory implicitly posited by the Court were
to be implemented, it would appear that many forms of formerly legal
parallel behavior are now illegal. 40
F. The Sherman Act, Section Two
Section Two of the Sherman Act declares it unlawful for any
person to "monopolize or attempt to monopolize or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of
the trade or commerce among the several states." 41 The portion of this
section that prohibits combinations and conspiracies to monopolize
would generally appear to be covered by Section One of the Act. However, Section Two proscribes two additional categories of power and
activity.
Section Two casts a critical eye upon the actions of firms of a very
large size or having great market power. Pertinent questions involve:
(1) the existence of power to foreclose actual or potential competition
and to control prices; and (2) the fact that this position is attained
or maintained by behavior, either unlawful or lawful, that indicates
an intention to use power.42
Important considerations inhere in the relevant geographic or
38. Id. at 335 (emphasis added).
39. Id. at 335 n.2.
40. See generally United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940);
Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HAav. L. REv. 7, 234-35 (1969).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964).
42. See United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956);
United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
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product market and in the share or proportion of that market that
must be possessed in order to infer liability. A relevant product market
is usually defined as encompassing all products that are identical or
of high cross-elasticity of demand by consumers. A suspect share of
that market can be a very complex determination. Nevertheless, shares
of over 60 percent would be highly problematical and shares of less
43
than 20 percent would be fairly safe.
In determining the relevant geographic market, a given firm's
areas of operations, be they local or national, are weighed heavily.
As Judge Wyzanski stated in United States v. Grinnell:
[T]here may well be local markets of limited territorial area, or city
markets, which . . . might be found in themselves to constitute, for

44
purposes of the antitrust laws, definable separate markets.

In New York there were some indications of possible violations of
Section Two. In the product market of government-insured mortgages
only a small handful of mortgage companies had cornered the market
for the eastern Brooklyn and southern Queens neighborhoods.
Significantly, there were many indications of an intent to use that
power. The very wide point spread exacted by mortgage companies
reflected an intent to use the situation for maximum profit. Also, the
exclusion of non-cooperating realtors was a reflection of a desire to
increase monopoly power. Finally, the bribery of Federal Housing
Administration officials in order to accelerate and guarantee applications demonstrated bad intent. For instance, many smaller competitors, using legitimate procedures, would lose customers because they
could not provide the same fast service. Many non-mortgage as well
as mortgage companies who were potential competitors refrained from
entering the market because of the repugnance of the procedures of
the few mortgage companies already there.
The second branch of prohibition under Section Two outlaws
various "attempts" to monopolize. 45 Considerations of the size of the
43. In United States v. Alcoa Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1945), Judge Hand held that 90 percent of the market was sufficient to be a monopoly,
but expressed skepticism that a share less than 60 percent would be. In United States
v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956), 20 percent of the market was
considered insufficient. See G. HALE & R. HALE, MARKET POWER, SIZE AND SHAPE
UNDER THE SHER16XAN ACT, § 3.8 (1958).
44. 236 F. Supp. 244, 253 (D.R.I. 1964).
45. Broadly stated, attempts included an intent to commit a crime coupled with
actions directed toward its accomplishment. Monopolization need not actually he'
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yompany as well as market power in the particular market in which
monopolization is sought are relevant inquiries but not necessary to
the finding of a monopoly. A specific intent to achieve a monopoly,
46
or to conspire to do so by unfair means or unfair practices, must exist.
Intent may be proven with either documentary or circumstantial
evidence. 47 Unfair "means" include predatory and coercive techniques
and boycotting.
Perhaps of greatest significance, as applied to the problem in New
York, is that price discrimination, which is generally considered a Clayton or Robinson-Patman Act offense, 48 has been declared to be an
unfair means of competition under the Sherman Act. Courts reason,
in part, that every price discrimination which cannot be explained by
economic reasons 49 is very likely to be dictated by monopolistic intent. 50
In United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,51 the Court held
illegal an arrangement whereby Paramount discriminated against

small independent exhibitors of films in favor of large affiliated and
.unaffiliated circuits through various provisions in their agreements
,with exhibitors. These favorable provisions included allowing large
achieved. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905); G. HALE & R. HALE,
supra note 43, at 360. An "attempt" has been defined as behavior "which would, if
successful accomplish monopolization and which, though falling short, nevertheless
approach so close as to create a dangerous probability of it . .

"

American Tobacco v.

United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
46. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 626 (1953).
47. See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
48. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964). The act states, in part, that it shall be
unlawful for any person to fix a price on goods with the condition, agreement or understanding that "the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods ... or
other commodities of a competitor . . . where the effect of such . . . condition, agree-

mont' or understanding may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly in any line of commerce." The Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1964)
states, in part, that it is illegal for any person to discriminate in price between purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality sold for use, consumption or resale
kvhere the effect may be "substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly in any line of commerce ....
"
Mortgages are considered to be neither goods nor commodities under the Clayton
and Robinson-Patman Acts and therefore are not covered by them.
1 49. Such as economics in the number of units purchased and distances involved
in transportation. See generally G. THOMPSON & G. BRADY, ANTI-TRUST FUNDAMENTALS

150-74 (1964).

50.
A41 (D.
; .51.
(1940).

Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 125,
Mass. 1960).
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 142-44, 159-60
See also United States v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 173 F.2d 79 (7th Cir.

1949); Blake & Blum, Network Television Rate Practices:A Case Study in the Failure
of,$ocial Control of Price Discrimination,74 YALE L.J. 1339, 1386 (1965).
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circuits deductions in film rentals if double bills were played and
52
allowing overage and underage privileges.
Evidence of possible price discrimination did not go unnoticed
in New York City. Incoming purchasers were uniformly charged
artificially inflated costs for houses, financing, and various incidental
fees. Yet purchasers in the non-target neighborhoods paid substantially less in transactions involving otherwise similar properties. Moreover, the system by which brokers and mortgage companies forced
extra payments was sometimes very arbitrarily administered; for example, some buyers paid only 25 dollars under the board while others
paid 200 dollars.
,G.The Federal Trade Commission Act

Section Five of the Federal Trade Commission Act outlaws "unIfair methods of competition" as well as "unfair or deceptive acts or
practices" and establishes the Federal Trade Commission to enforce
the law.53 Section Five has the same coverage as the Sherman Act to
the extent that proscription of unfair methods of competition includes
unreasonable restraints in interstate commerce. The Commission also
has jurisdiction over "incipient" behavior which, when full-blown,
would violate the Sherman or Clayton Acts. 4 Moreover, the Commission now has power to outlaw unfair competitive acts regardless of
whether they contravene the letter or even the spirit of the antitrust
laws. 55
The Commission also has power to proscribe practices as unfair
or deceptive in their effect on consumers regardless of their competitive character or effects.5 6 According to a recent far-reaching
52. "Underage and overage" is defined as the "practice of using excess film rental
earned in one circuit theatre to fulfill a rental commitment defaulted by another." 334
U.S. at 160 n.15.
53. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (1964): "Unfair methods of competition in commerce,
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce are hereby declared unlawful."
54. FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394-95 (1953).
55. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972). See M. HANDLER,
TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF ANTITRUST 1030-43 (1973).
56. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972). One of the main
purposes of the Act was to reach acts of fraud upon ordinary consumers that were not
easily reached by other avenues of law. Indeed, fraud is recognized as a main imperfection of the market place. See Hart & Hart, Market Imperfections: Enforcement of
Anti-Trust Laws in a Friction-Afflicted Economy, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 157, 171-73 (1953).
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Supreme Court decision, the Commission may now judge unfair or
deceptive conduct under Section Five by using "public values" in a
manner similar to that of a court of equity.r
The Section has been used to prevent many forms of price control and various kinds of group boycotting. 58 Both of these forms of
anticompetitive behavior surfaced in New York. Also, it has already
been seen that unfair and deceptive acts and practices, including defrauding thousands of homebuyers as well as several legitimate business
operations, appeared to characterize the behavior of several of the real
estate firms and mortgage companies operating in the now devastated
neighborhoods of eastern Brooklyn and southern Queens.

III.

THE ANTITRUST REMEDY

The effectiveness of using antitrust law in situations that exist
in New York and other cities is difficult to determine accurately
because, with a few limited exceptions,5 9 it has not been used previously. Nevertheless, there are indications that the antitrust approach
is useful.
First, the behavior of central actors affecting the problem areas,
including real estate operators, mortgage companies, banks, and the
FHA, can perhaps best be explained in terms of the pursuit of money
and the interplay of basic market forces such as competition, supply,
and demand. The problem is that the market place is not functioning
correctly. Antitrust law, more than any other single body of law,
was designed to correct overall market malfunctions. Other remedies,
such as civil rights law, civil and criminal fraud law, and real estate
law are extremely necessary; yet there is a tendency for them to alleviate the effects of the market place rather than to eliminate the,
57.

In FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972), the Court states':
Thus, legislative and judicial authorities alike convince us that the
Federal Trade Commission does not arrogate excessive power to itself if, in
measuring a practice against the elusive, but congressionally mandated standard
of fairness, it, like a court of equity, considers public values beyond simply those
enshrined in the letter or encompassed in the spirit of the antitrust laws.
Id. at 244.
58. Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941);
FTC v. Pacific States Paper Trade Ass'n, 273 U.S. 52 (1927).
59. E.g., Baker v. F & F Investment, 420 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1970); Montebello
Community Ass'n v. Goldseker, Civil No. 21552 (D. Md. Jan. 11, 1972). See I REAL
ESTATE LENDER'S REPORT 2, 3 (1973).
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underlying determinants when used in such a broad context as New'
York City.
Second, and related, antitrust law may permit more efficient use
of government prosecutorial resources. For instances, one antitrust
suit naming principal mortgage companies as defendants might yield
the same result as 50 independent criminal fraud prosecutions against
a number of realtors.06 The evidentiary requirements for a particular
fraud suit may be nearly impossible to fulfill whereas the same actors
may be more easily brought to justice in an antitrust suit which, in
some instances, has more generalized evidentiary requirements. Moreover, it has been suggested that civil rights suits are slow and costly
and therefore a questionable remedy for such problems as those which
exist in New York. 61
Finally, the antitrust laws provide a direct relief and an incentive
for suit to a large number of non-government plaintiffs through both
treble damage and injunctive provisions. 62 Private plaintiffs who may
bring suit include customers, competitors, minority shareholders, and
municipal corporations.
While an antitrust law approach has several advantages, there are
some limitations. As mentioned, the antitrust law as applied to lending and the real estate field is undeveloped and success cannot be
guaranteed in each case. In addition, plaintiffs may often discover
themselves pitted against defendants who are able to muster superior
legal talent and other resources which can be determinative in complex or prolonged cases. Furthermore, in some instances antitrust law,
despite more generalized or facilitative rules, such as per se tests and
the "expectation" theory, can present insurmountable evidentiary
problems. For example, there is often little hard core evidence available to prove conspiracy to maintain prices. Finally, even though immediate injunctive relief may often be available and the mere initiation of litigation may have a positive remedial influence, some suits
may take several years until final resolution.

60. Anthony Ascetta, Assistant U.S. Attorney (E.D.N.Y.) has commented that
it would take years to prosecute all of the criminal fraud FHA cases arising in his
district. Mr. Ascetta is the attorney in charge of FHA prosecution for the office. Remarks by Mr. Anthony Ascetta to Mr. Richard Saliterman, June 7, 1973.
61. Silverman, supra note 1, at 102.

62.

See S.

OPPENHEIM, CASES AND COMMENTS ON FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS

1036 (2d ed. 1959).
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IV.

ADDITIONAL

CONSIDERATIONS

We have seen that antitrust law, with some important limitations,
is both an applicable and effective remedy for many of the problems
in New York. Nevertheless, there are supplemental and substitute
remedies that might also be seriously considered by decision makers
in the real estate and real estate finance industries and in the governmental sector.
The most basic step is the promotion of competition in the
primary mortgage market. A surprising number of leading New York
financial institutions did not participate in making government-insured
or -guaranteed mortgages simply because they were either unfamiliar
with or reluctant to experiment with the mechanics of the program.
A better flow of information to lenders is needed. Institutions that
participate only on the secondary market for government-insured mortgages should consider entering the primary market. Participation
only on the secondary market may add to the evidentiary grounds of
awareness and, especially, intent to limit competition.3 Perhaps additional governmental financial incentives, such as premiums for loan
origination on insured mortgages, should be encouraged to make investing more attractive to institutions that are not now participating.
Along these lines, a recent article suggests additional compensation for
taking "integration" risks. 64
Secondly, since the Department of Housing and Urban Development is charged with the public trust of administering the FHA and
VA programs, its operations might be more carefully scrutinized. The
unusually high foreclosure rate in the problem neighborhoods should
have been clearly apparent at an early date to the Department. Moreover, a very large number of FHA appraisers and administrators, including the then head of the FHA New York insuring office, participated in the scheme of writing and sanctioning inflated appraisals,
expediting favored mortgage applications, and generally creating an
imperfect market.
A third possible action would be to eliminate the discount point
system on FHA and VA mortgages. We have seen that the exacting
of unconscionable point spreads was a root factor in New York's prob63. For instance, this may add to the risk of liability for geographical territorial
allocation.

64. Silverman, supra note 1, at 102.
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lem. In order for the discount point system to operate properly, a
market of keen or highly vigorous competition is needed; such markets
did not exist in New York City and other urban areas. In a highly
sophisticated article dealing solely with the abuses of the discount point
system operating in Kansas City, it has been stated that
[t]he discount point system was an ad hoc solution for financing
the housing boom of the 1950's, implemented without any guidelines
or regulations. Only the invisible hand of supply and demand in the
market place operated to determine the limit of discount points which
a lender could charge to make loans.6 5
The practices of playing discount point money into rapid profits by
quick foreclosures on FHA-insured mortgages on inner-city slum
property is the ultimate perversion of our attempt to improve housing
standards in America. 66
Additionally, it has been urged by several commentators that the
holder-in-due-course doctrine which traditionally has protected the
transferees of mortgage paper be amended in the case of governmentinsured paper. This would enable recourse against some of the purchasers on the secondary market who are less diligent in their affairs in
purchasing tainted paper. Indeed, actions might be brought against
some less diligent actors even without amending the law. A recent
publication sponsored by the Mortgage Bankers Association of America
suggests that some participants on the secondary level are knowledgeable of the activity on the origination level.
[A] few financial institutions buy FHA loans with little knowledge of
the property or community and with little to go on ....

Other insti-

tutions make a detailed inspection of the security, and evaluation of
the economic background of the community before buying. A very
important consideration from the standpoint of the purchasing institution is the reputation of the originator. 67

Other policies include equipping the Department of Housing and
Urban Development with greater injunctive and subpoena powers
to complement the powers it already has to suspend delinquent mort65. Hood & Hushner, The Discount Point System and its Effect on Federally
Insured Home Loans, 40 U.M.K.O.L. REV. 1, 22 (1971). See also Lord v. Marine Midland Trust Co., 61 Misc. 776, 306 N.Y.S. 2d 82 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
66. Hood & Hushner, supranote 65, at 23.
67. W. BRYANT, MORTGAGE LENDING 276 (1962).
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gage companies. 68 One commentator has suggested that a carefully
designed installment contract system replace the present governmentinsured mortgage system in urban areas. 69 This arrangement would
involve responsible real estate investors purchasing property for sale
to buyers. The investors would hold title to the property while providing buyers with permanent long-term financing. Onerous transfer
taxes, fees, and points generally would be eliminated. The investor
would serve as a buffer between buyer and financial institutions.
Finally, some legislators have suggested that a quasi-national bank
be set up to handle the complete housing finance process in some
areas.70 This bank, it has been further suggested, might be capitalized
by sale of government-guaranteed debentures to private investors. While
this may be one way of limiting the abuse of the point system and transfer process, it runs the danger of adding another anticompetitive element which could adversely affect the entire real estate and real estate
finance industries.
68. See Note, supranote 1, at 477.

69. Stegman, supra note 1, at 371, 373, 390.
70. Senator Charles Percy, for instance, has introduced a bill to establish a quasi
national housing finance bank. S. 1592, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). See Note, Government Programs to Encourage Private Investment in Low-Income Housing, 81 HARV. L.

Rav. 1295, 1319, 1324 (1968).

